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ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE AWARD OF
FEDERAL CONTRACTS
Arthur S. Miller*
result of the recent tremendous increase in national governmental activities is the growth in importance of federal purchases. Emerging from a relatively insignificant position, those purchases are today one of the most important national economic factors. 1
Purchases by the military establishment alone have a far-reaching effect
on the national economy. "For over a decade, military appropriations
and expenditures have been the principal exogenous factors affecting
the levels of employment, output, and expenditure in the economy," an
economist observed in 1951.2 And with the enhanced importance of
federal procurement, the technique of purchase-the government contract-has taken on a highly significant role. Not only are large
segments of American business dependent, at least in part, on the award
of federal contracts for their very livelihood, but the government contract has been frequently utilized as an instrument of social control.3
Federal contracts thus have both a buying and a social function; and
it seems to be entirely accurate to characterize them as "an institution
playing a major part in the economic, social, and political life of the
nation...."4

O
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" Assistant Professor, Emory Univexsity Law School.-Ed.
Compare a recent statement of Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt: " ••• [F]ederal
purchases are coming to dominate the national economy. Of our gross national product in
1

1929 of $103.8 billion, purchases of goods and services by state and local governments
accounted for 6.9%, the federal government merely 1.3%; but of our $327.8 billion of
gross national product in 1951 the state and local governments accounted for only 6%, the
federal government 12.7%. In other words, in the span of 22 years the direct effect of
purchases by state and local governments fell off about 14%, while that of the federal
government mounted almost 1000%." V A:NDERllILT, THE DoCTlllNE OP nm Sl!.eAllA'IION
oP POWERS AND !Ts PRBsENT·DAY SIGNIFICANCE 64 (1953).
2 J. P. Miller, "Military Procurement Policies: World War II and Today," 42 AM..
EcoN. Rav., PAPERS AND PnoCl!l!DINGS, No. 2, p. 453 (May 1952).
3 For a discussion, see the present writer's recent article, Miller, "Government Contracts and Social Control: A Preliminary Inquiry," 41 VA. L. Rav. 27 (1955).
4 Braucher, Book Review, 3 J. Pan. L. 247 at 248 (1954).
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If what has been said has any validity, then it becomes important
to determine the basic principles governing award of those contracts.
Of particular importance is the extent to which the government is free
to choose those with whom it will contract. For the social and economic importance of federal purchases generally and the dependence
of many :6.rms on government business in order to stay :financially
viable would seem to require that award of contracts should not be left
to the whim or uncontrolled discretion of procurement officers. This
article will discuss aspects of contract award by federal procurement
officials, attention being given both to the general question of freedom
of procurement officers to choose or reject :6.rms as potential contractors
and to the specific question of the power of the procurement agencies
to "blacklist" certain business concerns. Since the military establishment is the largest purchaser and also has the most detailed set of
procurement regulations, references to practices and procedures of the
government will be to those followed by the Department of Defense,
unless otherwise noted.
To place the government contract in its proper perspective, it may
be well at the outset to sketch briefly certain developments in private
contracting. The very essence of traditional contracting between
private individuals is that an individual has freedom of choice in making an agreement. The core of contract, at least historically, is that
one may choose the other party with whom he deals and, at the same
time, has a large area of maneuver in which dickering over terms may
take place.5
That concept must now be qualified. For little doubt exists that
there is a large difference between contract law in theory and as it appears in the textbooks and the ''agreement process" as it actually operates in the community. 6 The consensual nature of "agreement" becomes, on realistic analysis, something other than consent in important
areas where contract is used. In those areas, the act of consent is not
to terms bargained over and agreed to by equals. It is an act of submission to one in a superior position. The relationship between the
parties, thus, is often one of power, not contract in its traditional sense.
In many of the transactions between individuals in society, it is ap5 Compare this statement: " ••• [t]he two primary aspects of liberty of contract [are]
(1) there can be no contracts by compulsion, and (2) the parties are free as to the content
of their contracts." K:sssLl!R AND SHARP, CoNTRACTs: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (1953).
6 It has been noted that there is "a pathetic contrast between the law of contract as it
is taught in most textbooks, and modern contract as it functions in society." FmEDMANN,
LAw AND SocrAL CHANGE IN CoNTEMPORARY BRITAIN 34 (1951).
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parent that freedom of choice has been significantly narrowed, so much
so that often the choice one has is not between alternative means to
attain an end or to fulfill a desire. Rather, the choice is to contract in
a standardized "no bargaining" atmosphere or not to contract at all.
While it is usually possible to select the other party (although this is
not always true), under many agreements which the law calls "contracts" there is no bargaining, no dickering over terms. Freedom of
choice has thus degenerated to the freedom to choose from among those
able to exert a dominating power from a superior bargaining position.
All of this is illustrated by the fact that many s~alled contracts
h ave b ecome "compuIsory" or "standardized" or h ave b ecome "contracts of adhesion." 7 Examples where individual choice plays little
or no part are easily found: in insurance agreements, in conditional
sales, in public utility sales, in collective bargaining agreements (here
the individual worker has given up his bargaining to the more powerful group, the union). American law subsumes these and similar
agreements under the generic term "contract," but the relationship,
again, is not that, but one of power involving an act of submission.8
Traditional contract law still speaks in terms of private volition, of
complete freedom of choice. But in actual operation, something quite
different often appears in the form of "a counterprinciple of control
over private volition." 9 Not entirely, of course, for as Roscoe Pound
has pointed out, 'We have gone no further in America than supplementing the law of contracts. We have not wholly discarded it."10
This development has significance as a background against which
the government contract may be viewed. For it has often been stated
7 For discussions of the various aspects of the changing nature of contracts, see Isaacs,
''The Standardizing of Contracts," 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Pound, ''The New Feudalism," 16 A.B.A.J. 553 (1930); Lenhoff, "The Scope of Compulsory Contracts Proper," 43
CoL. L. REv. 586 (1943); Patterson, "Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball," 43 CoL.
L. REv. 731 (1943); Kessler, "Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract," 43 CoL. L. REv. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, "What Price Contract?-An Essay
in Perspective," 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Kahn-Freund, Introduction, in RENNER, THB
INsnTanoNs oP PRIVATE LAw AND THEIR SoCIAL FUNCTIONS (1949).
It may be well to indicate that the point to be noted here is not that increasing
standardization of contracts is either "good" or "bad" per se, but the fact that modem
transactions called "contracts" often vary significantly from what was traditionally viewed
as contractual agreements. The modern agreement, even if standardized, is certainly a convenient and perhaps a necessary method of operating in an industrial society. Cf. CoHBN,
LAw AND THE SoCIAL ORDER 107 et seq. (1933).
8 Cf. Kahn-Freund, Introduction, in RENNER, THE INsnTanoNs op PRIVATE LAw
AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (1949).
9 KBssLBR AND SHARP, CoNTRAcrrs: CASES AND MATERIALS 36-37 (1953).
10 Pound, ''The Rule of Law and the Modern Social Welfare State," 7 VAND. L. REv.
1 at 8 (1953).
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by courts that the contracts of the federal government are to be construed and interpreted in accordance with the same principles as those
controlling contracts between private individuals. An example of this
came in 1947 when the United States Supreme Court said: "It is
customary, where Congress has not adopted a different standard, to
apply to the construction of government contracts the principles of
general contract law."11 (Just what "general contract law" means
was left unsaid by the majority of the Court. However, Justice Black,
in dissenting, made much of the ambiguous nature of the term.) In
1954 the Court of Claims reaffirmed that position in this fashion:
" ... In the absence of some applicable federal statute to the contrary,
the Government, when it contracts with its citizens, subjects itself to
the same rules of law that govern private individuals."12 Such broad
statements leave much to be desired and, in fact, do little to solve
knotty problems in the construction of federal contracts. But the quoted
statements are typical and serve to point up some basis for comparing
those contracts with those of private individuals.
The basic principles guiding government procurement are set out
in legislation enacted by Congress over the years, in court decisions,
and in administrative decisions ( chiefly those of the Comptroller General of the United States). For the military departments, the Armed
Services Procurement Act of 194?1 3 is the chief legislative statement,
although other statutes have importance in relatively limited areas.
For the other procurement agencies, no such systematic statutory statement has been made. Their procedures are governed, so far as Congress is concerned, by a series of relatively helter-skelter enactments,
chieB.y Revised Statute 3709.14 In addition, the General Services Administration has been invested with authority to prescribe rules and
regulations governing procurement by the nonmilitary agencies.16 Court
decisions, principally those of the Court of Claims and the lower fed11Priebe 8c Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 at 411, 68 S.Ct. 123 (1947).
Compare United States v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 at 66 (1876): "The United States, when
they contract with their citizens, are controlled by the same laws that govern the citizens
in that behalf."
12 Hughes Transportation, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 212 at
228.
. ·
13 62 Stat. L. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §151 et seq.
14 Originally enacted in 1861, the present statute is set out in 41 U.S.C. (1952) §5,
the pertinent part of which reads as follows: "Unless otherwise provided in the appropriation concerned or other law, purchases and contracts for supplies or services for the Government may be made ••• only after advertising a sufficient time previously for proposals.•••"
lli Pursuant to §201 of the Federal Property and Administrative Service Acts of 1949,
63 Stat. L. 383 (1949), 40 U.S.C. (1952) §481.
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eral courts, also play an important part. But the judicial role is overshadowed in this area by the General Accounting Office, which has
built on its statutory mandate with the result that it has become the
most pervasive influence on the procuring agencies.16
Whatever law is applied by courts and agencies c~nstruing government contracts, it is clear that the national government, while contracting, operates from a superior bargaining position. This enables it
to impose its desires, to a large extent at least, upon its contractors. The
"agreement" process in contracting with the federal government is only
partially consensual. Significant aspects of the agreements are representative of an act of submission to the superior power of the government. In like fashion, then, to many contracts between private individuals, contracts of the United States usually contain major areas
where the agreement is purely nonconsensual. No bargaining takes
place, for example, over such contract clauses as that imposing minimum labor standards on the contractor or that requiring him to "buy
American" or that giving the government a unilateral right of termination.17 The principal area of maneuver, in which some dickering
may take place, is in the price field, and the determination of the firm
to get the award usually involves price considerations to the exclusion
of other factors. 18 ("Sole source" situations may alter that statement to
the extent that the government may be willing to bend and alter normal
procedures if a contractor, who is the only source of some required item,
is obdurate and refuses to take the contract unless those procedures are
changed to his liking. To that extent, a "sole source" reverses the
normal situation and approaches the government at least on an equal
plane, if not from a superior position. Power being roughly equal, the
sole source may force desired modifications in terms and conditions
imposed upon other contractors not so fortunately situated.)
16 The main apparent aim of the Comptroller General is that of saving money for the
government. But the activities of the General Accounting Office may have their unfortunate results. "While the General Accounting Office has without doubt done much to
insure care and honesty upon the part of federal purchasing agencies and industry, the
rulings of the Comptroller General have often interfer~d with expeditious and efficient
purchasing practices." J. P. Mir.um, Pru:CING OP Mn.rrARY PnoctJRBMBNTS 29 (1949).
See also, Ramey and Erlewine, "Mistakes and Bailouts of Suppliers under Government
Contracts and Subcontracts-A Study of Doctrine, Practice and Adhesions," 39 CoBN.
L.Q. 634 (1954).
17 For a general discussion of contract clauses in government contracts, see LUPTON,
GoVERNMENT CoNT.RACTS SIMPLIFIED, c. 5 (1953). Risik, ''Federal Government Contract
Clauses and Forms,'' 23 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 125 (1954).
18 This is true in the case of "negotiated" as well as "advertised" procurements, but
more so in the latter type.
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For our present purposes, the point to be seen is that while this
article is inquiring into the question of choice of contractor, the government is largely in control of the other chief attribute of traditional
liberty of contract: the terms and conditions of the contract itself. We
may thus summarize a first conclusion in the inquiry under consideration in this manner: the government is under no restraint as to many
of the terms and conditions of its contracts and may impose those conditions it deems necessary. These are imposed as a result of a statute
(an example of the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act) or an executive order (for example, the nondiscrimination in employment clause)
or administrative regulation ( one of the more important is that allowing termination of the contract for "convenience of the government'').
The Supreme Court has furnished explicit support for that conclusion:
"Like private individuals and businesses, the Government enjoys the
unrestricted power . . . to :6x the terms and conditions upon which it
will make needed purchases."19
What limitations, if any, exist as to
choice of contractor by federal procurement agencies? This half of the
traditional liberty of contract concept is not so easily answered.

I. A

BmnER

MusT

BE "RESPONSIBLE"

One way of looking at the question under inquiry is to ask this
question: when, and under what circumstances, may a contracting
officer refuse to do business with a particular firm? A complete answer
to that question should reveal the fundamental principles governing
choice of contractor by the government.
At the outset it should be noted that Congress has insisted that it
be a fundamental proposition of government purchasing that competition be obtained, if at all possible, before award of a contract. This
principle finds expression, for example, in the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, section 3(a) of which directs that the basic method
of procurement is that of formally advertising the proposed purchase.
Under this system sealed bids are received and award made to the lowest responsible bidder. The advertising is to be conducted in a manner
which will permit "full and free competition ... consistent with the
procurement of types of supplies and services necessary to meet .
•
reqmrements
...."20
19 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 at 127, 60 S.Ct. 869 (1940). The
present status of this case may be doubtful. See discussion on pp. 803-804 infra.
20 62 Stat. L. 22-23 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §l52(a).
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Congress, however, made provision for procurement without use
of the sealed bid system by allowing use of the relatively informal
"negotiation" procedure in specific instances. In seventeen exceptions
set out in the Armed Services Procurement Act, formal advertising need
not be utilized. The key exception here is that in section 2(c)(l),
allowing blanket use of negotiation techniques in times of national
emergency. In effect a word of art, negotiation is perhaps best definable as the procedure followed when contracts are awarded after less
formalized methods; greater flexibility is possible since the stringent
requirements which have developed in formal advertising need not be
followed.
Inherent inadequacies in the formal bid system21 plus the presidential declaration of national emergency in December 1950, which
allowed blanket use of section 2(c)(l), has resulted in the great majority of military contracts since 1950 being awarded after negotiation.22
To a large extent, the congressional mandate in this regard has been
superseded by administrative determination. The act contemplates that
the great volume of purchases would be made under the sealed bid
system. Probably Congress did not visualize that the emergency declared following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea would continue
in effect long after the cessation of combat. Probably, also, the shortcomings of the formal bid system will continue to result in the widespread use of negotiation with its greater flexibility and capacity for
use in any situation.
While different stricter rules and regulations apply for the award
of contracts under formal advertising procedures than for those awarded
following negotiation techniques, for present purposes no differentiation need be made. The question under inquiry may be developed
and conclusions drawn without regard to the procedure followed. 23
A second conclusion may be stated in this fashion: a -firm must be
a responsible bidder in order to receive award of a federal contract.
21 See

J. P. Miller, ''Military Procurement Policies: World War II and Today," 42

AM.. EcoN. REv., Papers and Proceedings, No. 2, p. 453 (May 1952).
22 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954, for example, the Department of Defense
entered into 2,792,473 procurement actions within the United States. Of these, 2,590,345
were negotiated (92.8%) and 202,128 (7.2%) were advertised. The net value of military
prime contracts awarded in the same period within the United States was $11.7 billion,
of which $9.9 billion represented negotiated contracts and $1.8 billion advertised contracts.
See Report of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply and Logistics) entitled: "Military
Prime Contracts with Small Business," dated 27 October 1954.
23 And it makes no difference for the present discussion that the final contract may
be "fixed price," "cost-plus-fixed-fee," or whatever other type is decided upon by the
procurement officials.
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Military contracts, by statute, are to be made to that "responsible bidder
whose bid ... will be most advantageous to the Government, price and
other factors considered. . . ."24 That is a statutory requirement of
what had been case law.25
Who, then, is a responsible bidder? It has been said that the term
"responsible" means "something more than pecuniary ability; it includes
also judgment, skill, ability, capacity and integrity."26 This statement
of the criteria of responsibility finds similar expression in the administrative regulations implementing the Armed Services Procurement Act.
Paragraphs 2-406. I and 1-307 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) indicate ·that the matters to be considered in deciding
whether a potential supplier is responsible include (a) the status of the
bidder as a manufacturer or regular dealer, (b) financial responsibility,
(c) skill and experience, and (d) prior conduct and performance.27
Decision as to who is or is not a responsible bidder is made by the
individual procurement officer, operating under internal administrative
directives issued by the agency whose employee he is. To aid that
officer in making that determination, it is not unusual for a so-called
"business clearance" or "facility capability report" to be made. Mandatory for military buying, under such a procedure the firm in question
is surveyed by a team of experts and its capacity to produce analyzed.
A judgment is then made of its ability to perform the proposed contract
in the required time and in consonance with the desired quality standards. Failure to meet any of the criteria for responsibility will normally
result in the denial of a contract, even in those cases where the firm
in question has submitted the lowest price. This foreknowledge is an
24 62 Stat. L. 23 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §l52(b).
25 See, e.g., O'Brien v. Carney, (D.C. Mass. 1934) 6

F. Supp. 761; Scott v. United
States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (1909); 20 Comp. Gen. 862 (1941). "The question whether a
particular bidder is a 'responsible bidder' requires sound business judgment, and involves
an evaluation of the bidder's experience, facilities, technical organization, reputation, finan.
cial resources, and other factors." S. Rep. 571, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1947), reprinted in
2 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1048 at 1064 (1948).
26 O'Brien v. Carney, (D.C. Mass. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 761 at 762.
27 The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (hereinafter cited ASPR) is published in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. Both of those sources
are usually months in arrears. A handier, though unofficial, source which keeps up-to-date
with new developments is CCH, G017ernment Contracts Reporter, a loose-leaf service.
Paragraph 2-406.1 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation appears at 32 C.F.R.
§400 (1952), IA CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAC'I'S REP. ,r29,086 (1954).
ASPR 2-406.3 lists the following as other factors besides price that may be considered
in making an award: judgment, skill, and integrity of a bidder; reputation and experience
of a bidder; foreseeable costs or delays attributable to differences in manufacturing methods;
changes requested by the bidder; restrictions or conditions imposed in the bid; and possible
advantages that might result from making multiple awards.
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educated guess of capability; it provides the basis for the elimination of
certain £rms from consideration for contract award. That determination, however, is often difficult to make.
The criterion of manufacturer or regular dealer probably causes
least trouble. The Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act contains a
similar provision which limits award of contracts for supplies over
$10,000 in amount to manufacturers or regular dealers. Under that
statute the Secretary of Labor regularly issues determinations that certain £rms do not meet the standards to qualify as either. The job of
the procurement officer is simplified since, for most purposes at least, he
need only check the list of firms so designated by the Secretary of
Labor.28
But more difficulty is involved in cases of alleged £nancial inadequacy. Ways exist to cure some such inadequacies. While it is cer~
tainly not desirable to award a contract to a firm lacking sufficient £nancial resources to complete it, still the cost to the government may be
significantly increased if award is made to other than the lowest bidder.
An additional judgment thus is in order: will alternative procedures,
such as the requirement of a performance bond, adequately protect the
interests of the government? If so, then perhaps the £nancial weakness
should be waived. 29 But performance bonds do not, if default is made,
give delivery of the desired items; for the military at least, this is often
all-important. In that case, the procurement officer will often explore
the possibility of government financing, particularly along the line of
progress payments or advance payments, and thus curing the firm's
financial troubles. 30 A government-sponsored loan is another possibility, one made, for example, by the Small Business Administration.31
For major prime contractors, such as large airplane manufacturers, still
other £nancial arrangements may be made.32
28 See LUPTON, GoVERNMENT CoNTRAcrs SIM.P.LIFllID 195, 299 (1953) for a brief
discussion of the manufacturer-regular dealer requirement. And see 10 Comp. Gen. 314
(1931) for a ruling that "advertisements for supplies ••• may properly limit competition
to manufacturers of, or regular dealers in, such supplies. • • ." Definitions of the Secretary
of Labor of manufacturers and regular dealers may be found in 3 CCH LAB. LAw REP.
1126,200 (1953).
2 9 Cf. 6 Comp. Gen. 557 (1927); 13 Comp. Gen. 274 (1934).
so See 18 Comp. Gen. 330 (1938).
SlAuthorized in the Small Business Act of 1953, 67 Stat. L. 233, 15 U.S.C. (Supp.
I, 1954) §§631-633.
82 For a description of one such financial arrangement, see Cary, "Government Financing of Essential Contractors: The Reorganization of the Glenn L. Martin Company," 66
HARV. L. R.Bv. 834 (1953).
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Over that hurdle, the element of skill and experience still causes
major difficulty. Here, as in cases of :financial irresponsibility, the
nature and magnitude of the subject matter of the contract may be an
important consideration. Contracts for research and development and
for items of technological complexity must go to those companies which
have demonstrated their ability to do the required work. But performance bonds can be used to protect against nonperformance in the routine procurement. The result is that except in contracts involving unusual technical skills, little authority exists for further limiting competition by eliminating firms under this criterion. 33 The interest of
obtaining needed supplies at the most economical price will outweigh
lack of previous experience in most, if not all, contracts involving work
not calling for unusual skills.34 Again, however, the military services
are not interested in recovery under performance bonds; rather, they
desire the timely delivery of needed equipment.
Past unsatisfactory service by a contractor will not ordinarily be
considered adequate cause for the rejection of a low bid fro:r,n an otherwise responsible bidder. A default, for example, on a previous contract
will not allow refusal of the award of a new contract.35 On the other
hand, repeated failures to perform or repeated attempts to avoid proper
performance of work may serve to justify rejection of the lowest bid.36
And a bidder's reputation and his ethics may be grounds for refusing
to do business with him.37
In broad general terms the foregoing outline develops the requirement of responsibility for a firm to be eligible to receive a federal contract. One additional question is of interest in that connection: to what
extent, if at all, is administrative discretion in determining the lowest
responsible bidder subject to judicial review? Discussion of this ques33 See 6 Comp. Gen. 210 (1926); 6 Comp. Gen. 557 (1927); 20 Comp. Gen. 862
(1941); 30 Comp. Gen. 235 "(1950).
34 See 14 Comp. Gen. 305· (1934); 8 Comp. Gen. 252 (1928); 7 Comp. Gen. 181
(1927). Cf. 27 Comp. Gen. 343 (1947).
·
35 Cf. 25 Comp. Gen. 859 (1946); and see 7 Comp. Gen. 547 (1928); l Comp.
Gen. 304 (1921).
36 See Comp. Gen. Dec. A-70057 (Feb. 1, 1936) (unpublished). See, also, ASPR
1-604.1, allowing debarment of a bidder for a history of failure to perform or of unsatisfactory performance on one or more contracts. IA CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAcrs REP.
,r29,049E (1955).
37 The Facility Capability Report of the Air Force is an example. One of the questions to be answered by the survey team is: Are the business practices of the firm considered satisfactory insofar as is known or can be determined without benefit of a complete
investigation? See DEPT. 011 THE Am FonCE, Am FonCE PnoctmllMENT INSTRUCTIONS
,r52-103 (1954).
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tion will be undertaken more fully below; suffice it at this time to say
that an extremely broad discretion is exercised by the buying agency
in the determination and that that discretion has not as yet been subjected to judicial second-guessing. This coincides with the apparent congressional intent.38 Some relief may be available, however, to a disappointed bidder in the form of a protest lodged with the Comptroller
General. That official will entertain a protest against award and make
a decision as to the propriety of the rejection of complainant's bid.89
II. SoME

OTHER FACTORS LIMITING COMPETITION

Many other considerations go into the award of military contracts.
For example, the procurement officer usually must buy from a domestic,
i.e., American, £rm to the exclusion of a foreign bidder ( or an American import firm handling foreign-made products) unless the prices of
the domestic firms are clearly unreasonable. 4 ° Congress has often stated
its policy of insuring that small business obtain a fair share of government spending; in some instances, thus, a firm termed "big" will be
denied an opportunity to get a contract.41 Geographical areas where a
condition of substantial unemployment exists may be favored under
Defense Manpower Policy No. 4, with the result that firms in those
areas will be awarded contracts provided that they can meet the price
of firms from outside those areas. 42 Dispersal of industry, the desirability of developing additional sources for the production of critical
items, and the avoidance of concentration of contracts in a few suppliers are other policies which may, in particular instances, serve to
limit competition.43
ss See O'Brien v. Camey, (D.C. Mass. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 761; Walter P. Villere Co.
v. Blinn, (5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 914.
89 See 32 Comp. Gen. 251 (1952); 16 Comp. Gen. 497 (1936); 13 Comp. Gen. 315
(1934).
4 0Required by the Buy American Act, 47 Stat. L. 1520 (1933), as amended, 41
U.S.C. (1952) §§l0a-d, and other legislation incorporating the anti-foreign principle.
Section VI of the ASPR contains a statement of the prohibitions. See IA CCH, Govr.
CoNTRA.CTS REP. ,m29,300 to 29,323 (1954). See also 30 Comp. Gen. 384 (1951).
41An example is §2(b) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, a portion
of which reads as follows: ''It is the declared policy of the Congress that a fair proportion
of the total purchases and contracts . • • for the Government shall be placed with small
business concerns." 62 Stat. L. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §l5I(b). See 31 Comp.
Gen. 347 (1952); 30 Comp. Gen. 441 (1951); 28 Comp. Gen. 662 (1949).
42Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 was promulgated February 7, 1952. 17 FED.
REG. 1195 (1952). For the present form of the policy and its implementation, see 1 CCH,
Govr. CoNTRACTS REP. ,i2261.
43 On December 7, 1954, the Secretary of Defense directed the military services to
procure equipment and supplies in .accordance with the following criteria:· (a) maintaining
multiple sources of supply; (b) geographic ruspersal; (c) avoidance of undue concentration
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Most, perhaps all, of those situations are inconsistent with what is
perhaps the most fundamental principle of government procurement:
that of getting the required goods at a decent price at the time desired. 44
In each instance a policy objective is furthered at the expense of normal
procurement goals. A third statement may, accordingly, be summarized
in this fashion: certain firms may be denied contracts even if otherwise
fully qualified and responsible, and other firms awarded those contracts,
for reasons which are considered by Congress or the President or the
buying agency to override normal procurement objectives. That, in
operation, this may be inconsistent with the second statement made
above has not seemed to trouble government officials unduly, including
members of Congress.

III.

UNRESPONSIVE·

Bms

Another category may be made of those situations where the bidder
is not responsive to the terms of the invitation for bids. This group
involves only formally advertised procurements because defects in proposals in response to the request for proposals by which negotiated
procurements are begun may be cured during the process of negotiation.
In contrast to the flexible negotiation procedures, in the formally
advertised procurement situation the bidder must adhere rigidly to the
terms of the invitation by the government to submit bids or lose out for
not being "responsive." A fourth statement may be made, therefore,
in this manner: those firms will be denied contracts which fail to abide
by the requirements of the invitation for bids. And this is true even if
the bidder makes an honest mistake or inadvertently overlooks some requirement. Moreover, in event of mistake the result may be that the
bidder will be held to the terms of his bid as made and that he will not
be allowed to modify or withdraw it.
Several situations illustrate the concept of unresponsiveness in
bidding. First of all, a bid may fail to conform to the specifications
desired. This means that the bidder must promise to deliver items
of contracts in a few leading suppliers; (d) preservation of essential skilled labor forces;
(e) utilization of existing open industrial capacity; (f) preservation of essential management organization and know-how; and (g) a maximum degree of subcontracting. N.Y.
T1MEs, Dec. 9, 1954, p. 1:7. See 31 Comp. Gen. 279 (1952).
44 See J. P. Miller, "Military Procurement Policies: World War II and Today," 42
AM. EcoN. REv., PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS No. 2, p. 453 at 457-458 (May 1952), for
a statement of the five major objectives of the military procurement program. Briefly, they
are fulfillment of requirements, efficient production, budgetary economy, economic stabilization, and socio-political objectives.
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which are not materially at variance with the technical attributes of the
required product. In a case, for instance, where the government wanted
steel to conform to specification no. 352a and the bidder specified use
of steel per specification no. 352, the Comptroller General ruled that
award could not be made to the low bidder.45
The cases where the bidder fails to conform to the required delivery
date furnish a second example of an unresponsive bid. This applies
only in procurements where time is of the essence. In those cases and
where the invitation so specifies, a bid will not be considered unless
delivery of the items is promised within the required time. 46
A third category is made up of cases where the bid does not conform to essential provisions of the invitation for bids. An example of
this came in 1944 when, in reply to an invitation to bid on laundry
services, the only bidder deleted the required Eight-Hour Law provision
on the mistaken assumption that it had been suspended by the war
emergency; the bid was accepted because it was the only bid and the
services were urgently required. Nevertheless, the Comptroller General
declared the contract to be invalid.47
Still another situation authorizing rejection of the low bid as unresponsive arises when improper restrictions or conditions are inserted
in the bid of the company. (This situation clearly illustrates the nonconsensual nature of significant parts of government contracts: no
deviation is allowed from the invitation to contract. A firm does business on the government's terms or it does not get the award.) Such a
restriction must, however, be of more than a minor nature; it must be
of sufficient substance that "further orderly procedure is uncertain or
impossible."48 An attempt by a firm to protect itself against such future
changes in conditions as increased costs, or an attempt to limit its liability, or an attempt to shift the burden of risk to the government will
all allow the contracting officer to reject low bids. The rationale is that
to allow the imposition of such conditions would make the government's obligation uncertain or indefinite and would be unfair to other
bidders in that a contract accepting such conditions would not be the
proposal offered to the other bidders.
45 9 Comp. Gen. 24 (1929). See also 17 Comp. Gen. 554 (1938); 19 Comp. Gen.
662 (1940); 30 Comp. Gen. 179 (1950).
4 6 See Sequoia Mills v. United States, 60 Ct. CI. 985 (1925); 20 Comp. Gen. 4
(1940); 34 Comp. Gen. 24 (1954); 20 Op. Atty. Gen. 496 (1892).
47 24 Comp. Gen. 376 (1944).
48 E.g., 20 Comp. Gen. 216 (1940); 20 Comp. Gen. 4 (1940); 17 Comp. Gen. 864
(1938); 15 Comp. Gen. 553 (1935).
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INELIGIBLE FIRMS

Discussed above have been the situations which constitute the bulk
of cases whereby firms seeking government contracts may be eliminated
from competition. Another category exists, however, which involves
relatively few would-be contractors but which has features raising some
troublesome questions in administrative procedure. The following
question indicates the nature of this category: to what extent may a .
buying agency "blacklist" a business concern? That is to say, may a
company be refused a contract for ethical reasons or because its integrity is considered to be substandard? If so, what are the limitations on
this power of disqualification?
To begin with, it should be stated that federal buying agencies do
exercise power to establish and maintain lists of firms to whom awards
will not be inade--in other words, to blacklist. In what manner and
under what criteria may such blacklisting be exercised?
The term itself is a catch-all colloquialism not particularly descri~
tive of what in fact takes place when certain firms are disqualified from
receiving a federal contract. In practice, the word is not used. Rather,
the technical terms of "ineligibility," "debarment," and "suspension,"
all of which have more precise referents, are in common use. Although
no definition of the latter words is to be found in statute or regulation,
they refer to different activities under the procedure of disqualification
of bidders. Distinctions between them may, on analysis, be more apparent than real; nevertheless, they are used. An example appears in
the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, one part of which "prescribes policies and procedures relating to the debarment of bidders ... ,
ineligibility of bidders . . . , and the suspension of bidders. . . ."49
Finns "ineligible" to receive contracts include those found to have
violated the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act/' 0 the Davis-Bacon
Act,51 or the Buy American Act,52 and those who do not qualify as
"manufacturers" or "regular dealers" under the Walsh-Healey Act.
Those "debarred" are firms convicted of fraud or other criminal offense
in connection with a contract or convicted of a violation of the anti.trust laws. Those "suspended" are those who are suspected of having
committed fraud or other criminal offense in connection with a contract.
49 ASPR 1-600, reported at. IA CCH Govr. CoNTRAars RBP. ,J29,049A (1955).
11049 Stat. L. 2038 (1936), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §35.
5146 Stat. L. 1494 (1931), 40 U.S.C. (1952) §276a-2(a).
5247 Stat. L. 1520 (1933), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §IOb(h).

•
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In short, business firms blacklisted fall into one of two general categories: those who have been convicted of violation or of a failure to
observe some federal statute and those who are merely suspected of
having committed such a violation or failure. Accordingly, a fifth statement may be made: certain firms may be barred from obtaining-or,
perhaps more importantly, from even being considered for-a federal
contract where those firms have been convicted of a statutory violation
or are suspected of having committed such a violation.58
"The penalty of blacklisting is so severe that its imposition may
destroy a going business."54 That being so, the procedure of how this
action is taken and the question of whether the administrative procedure should be changed seems to be worthy of comment in some detail.

V.

DEBARMENT AND INELIGIBILITY

One of the sanctions imposed by Congress in order to insure adherence to the Walsh-Healey, Davis-Bacon and Buy American Acts is the
provision made in those statutes for disqualification of violators for a
period of three years. One part of the Walsh-Healey Act directs the
Comptroller General to distribute a list to all agencies containing the
names of persons or firms found by the Secretary of Labor to have
breached any of the agreements or representations required by that
act.55 That statute, in addition, imposes the requirement of being a
manufacturer or regular dealer on those firms desiring to contract with
the federal government. Under the Davis-Bacon Act, violators are also
listed by the Comptroller General after a similar determination by the
Secretary of Labor. Buy American Act violators are similarly treated.
In addition to the above-mentioned statutes, federal contractors may
run afoul of another group of prohibitions imposed by the Secretary of
Labor by regulation. Acting under authority delegated by Congress in
58 Or are, for those contracts within the purview of the Walsh-Healey Act, determined
by the Secretary of Labor to be neither a manufacturer nor a regular dealer.
MATrY. GEN. COMM. ON An. Pnoc., DIVISION OF PuBuc CoNTRAC'l's 4 (1939)
(mimeographed monograph). As of November 15, 1954, 20 business enterprises and 27
individuals were barred under the Walsh-Healey Act, and 15 firms and 16 individuals
under the Davis-Bacon Act. Pursuant to the Secretary of Labor's regulations, noted in note
56 infra, as of November 15, 1954, five firms and one individual were on the ineligible
list for violations of the Housing Act of 1949, and five firms and six individuals for violations of the Eight-Hour Law. Communication from the Assistant General Counsel, General Accounting Office, to the present writer, dated December 10, 1954.
55 See Ball, ''Blacklisting Federal Contractors," 28 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 147 (1943),
for a discussion of the early practice under the Walsh-Healey Act. See 3 CCH, LAB. LAw
SERv. ,i26,108 (1953) for reports of decisions by the Labor Department.
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Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950, the Secretary of Labor has promulgated a set of standards, regulations, and procedures with respect
to administration and enforcement by federal agencies of labor standards provisions applicable to contracts covering federally financed and
assisted construction.56 Under these regulations, which have the same
effect as a statute, firms found in willful or aggravated violation of any
of eight federal statutes are treated in a fashion similar to those found
to have violated the Walsh-Healey or Davis-Bacon Acts.
No other express congressionally-approved provision exists for disqualifying firms from getting federal contracts. However, administrative regulations provide for disqualification in other instances. The key
regulation here is that issued by the General Services Administration,
entitled "Debarment of Bidders," which provides the basis for further
disqualification action by both civilian and military agencies. The
· regulation notes the aforementioned statutory disqualification, including those imposed by the Secretary of Labor, and then provides as
follows (§207.03):
"... Entry shall be made on the debarment and ineligible lists
of lirms or individuals on the following bases:
"d. Those the executive agency determines to debar administratively for any of the causes and under all of the appropriate
conditions listed in subsection 207.05."57
Section 5 of the regulation authorizes debarment "in the public
interest" for conviction of a criminal offense in obtaining or performing
a government contract, conviction of violation of the antitrust laws
arising out of submission of bids or proposals, a serious and willful
failure to deliver on a previous contract or a history of unsatisfactory
performance on previous contracts or violation of the contractual cove56 Published in the Federal Register at 16 FED. REG. 4430 (1951), 16 FED. REG.
11592 (1951), and 17 FED. REG. 11593 (1952); codified at 29A C.F.R. (Supp. 1954)
§5. For Reorganization Plan No. 14 of 1950, see 15 FED. REG. 3176 (1950); 63 Stat. L.
207 (1949), 5 u.s.c. (1952) §1332-15.
The statutes concerned are (1) the Anti-Kickback Act; (2) the Eight-Hour Law; (3)
the National Housing Act; (4) the Hospital Survey and Construction Act; (5) the Federal Airport Act; (6) the Housing Act of 1949; (7) the School Survey and Construction
Act of 1950; (8) the Defense Housing and Community Facilities and Services Act of
1951. 'These statutes are cited in 29A C.F.R. (Supp. 1954) §5.
57 GSA Reg. 1-II-207.00, issued Jan. 5, 1953, and amended by GSA General Regulation No. 15, dated June 17, 1954. The text references are made to the regulation as
amended. According to the letter (No. 1-11, Jan. 5, 1953) transmitting the regulation to
the heads of federal agencies, approval was given to its promulgation by the Comptroller
General of the United States.
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nant against contingent fees, and debarment by some other federal
agency. The military departments have followed the provisions of this
regulation and provide for debarment in essentially the same terms as
those listed.
Restrictions applicable against contractors debarred by the military
departments include those of not awarding contracts to or soliciting
proposals from those firms, possible termination of existing contracts,
and possible withholding of funds due under existing contracts. In
addition, in those contracts where the government has reserved the
right to approve subcontracts, the award of a subcontract to a debarred
firm will be disapproved; in certain cases, this may include "second-tier"
subcontracts, that is, sub-subcontracts.
But both the General Services Administration's regulation and the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation provide certain administrative safeguards which go far to prevent arbitrary or ill-considered action
on the part of procurement officials. Provision is made in the regulations for notification to the affected £rm of the action taken and an
opportunity afforded to contest the determination administratively. An
additional safeguard exists in the opportunity to ask the Comptroller
General to intervene should the bid of a debarred contractor be rejected
by a contracting officer.
In cases, then, of both ineligibility and debarment, the procurement
agencies have built-in administrative machinery which will prevent
taking action in secret and which will give the affected concern a chance
to know what it is faced with and to contest whatever charges there
may be. The final category of blacklisted firms is, however, one where
these procedural safeguards do not exist.

VI.

SUSPENSION OF CONTRACTORS

The General Services Administration's regulation permits agencies
to add additional names to the disqualified list:
"Nothing in this section shall prevent any agency from supplementing the consolidated list with names of firms or individuals administratively determined to be included, in accordance
with procedures established by such agency, for causes other than
those specifically set forth herein, or from establishing such other
lists as any agency, in its discretion, may elect to use." 58
58 GSA

Reg. 1-II-207.08 Qan. 5, 1953).

798

M1cmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

It is upon this subsection that the military departments apparently
rely for authority for the procedure of "suspending" firms suspected of
having some species of fraud or other criminal act in connection with
obtaining, attempting to obtain, or in the performance of a contract.
According to the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, suspension
is to be for "a temporary period pending the completion of investigation and such legal proceedings as may ensue." Restrictions to be
placed upon the contractor during suspension include nonsolicitation
of bids and proposals and possible termination of existing contracts,
withholding of funds due on existing contracts, and the disapproval of
subcontract awards to such firms. All of this•is to be done without notifying the firm.
By summary administrative action, then, which is taken without
notice or hearing or opportunity either to know or to contest whatever
evidence may motivate the action, a company is abruptly deprived of
opportunities to bid, to be paid, or even to know what the trouble is.
"A suspended Contractor will not be informed of the prohibitions
effected against him," states the military regulation.
But some recognition is given of the far-reaching effect of such
action and procurement officials are admonished that suspension is "a
drastic action which must be based upon adequate evidence rather than
mere accusation" and that the placing of the name of a firm on the
suspended list will be for "the purpose of protecting the interest of the
Government and not for punishment." Some modification of the proscriptions of the suspension policy are possible when it is determined
that a modification would be to the government's interest.119
That procedure raises several problems: (a) the source of the
authority and the legal basis of suspension action; (b) relief, if any,
availaole to a firm against whom suspension action has been taken;
(c) whether the procedure as now in operation meets minimum standards of procedural due process; and (d) whether other procedures
could be created to insure that the interests of the government are fully
protected on the one hand and that full protection is accorded the
individual business enterprise on the other.
1

119 ASPR I-600 through 1-609 contains not only the regulations for debarment but
also for suspension. The quoted matter in the text is taken from these paragraphs. See IA
CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAcrs REP. ,r,r29,049A to 29,0491 (1954).
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A. Authority for Suspension
No express statutory authority exists for suspension action by the
military procurement authorities. At no place in the Armed Services
Procurement Act is there even recognition by Congress that summary
action of that type may be taken. The legislative history is silent,
although the Senate Report does contain language stating that a bidder's
reputation may be evaluated in determining responsibility of bidders. 60
No judicial decision directly on point has been found. However, the
Comptroller General, ever-watchful guardian of the tax dollar, has
stated that "as a general rule there is no authority for the debarment
of bidders and all bids should be received and given consideration on
an equal basis."61 Since suspension action is taken on the basis of
unproved facts-on a suspicion, not a certainty, of irregularity-it
would seem to be an a fortiori case that the Comptroller General would,
in a proper case, likewise disapprove of suspension. (Not, be it noted,
because of any desire to insure procedural due process, but to save
Uncle Sam some money; apparently, it is dollars, not attempts to attain
justice, which motivates that office.)
The absence of either statutory or judicial authority for the power
to suspend is not, of course, determinative of the question. It would
take no farfetched reasoning to establish such a power on rather wellfounded grounds. In one sense the question is answered by a dictum
in Perkins 11. Lukens Steel Company, 62 the case upholding the constitutionality of the Walsh-Healey Act. There the Supreme Court made
this oft-quoted statement: "Like private individuals and businesses,
the Government enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own
supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms
and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." The Court
then held that a contractor had no "standing" to contest an administrative action by the Secretary of Labor. But suspension was not before
60 "The question whether a particular bidder is a 'responsible bidder' requires sound
business judgment, and involves an evaluation of the bidder's experience, facilities, technical organization, reputation, financial resources, and other factors. The service concerned
with the procurement of goods of the type dealt in by the bidder is naturally best qualified
to make this evaluation, and broad discretion is accordingly reserved to the service in this
respect." S. Rep. 571, 80th Cong., 2d sess., July 16, 1947, published in 2 U.S. Code
Cong. Serv. 1048 at 1064 (1948).
61 7 Comp. Gen. 547 (1928).
62 310 U.S. 113 at 127, 60 S.Ct. 869 (1940).
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the Court in that case, and its present validity has possibly been watered
down by subsequent congressional action (see below).
The Lukens Steel decision aside, a compelling case may be made
for the proposition that suspension power is a necessary derivative from
the power granted in the Armed Services Procurement Act to determine
responsibility of bidders. In addition to the aforementioned Senate
Report's reference to reputation in determining a bidder's responsibility, some recent fairly analogous case material is available. During
World War II it was the practice of some of the emergency agencies,
notably the Office of Price Administration (OPA) and the War Production Board (WPB), to issue suspension orders for violations of wartime rationing and material-allocation regulations. Such an order resulted in making rationed articles unavailable to the violator, thus
creating a most serious situation of depriving the violator of his means
of livelihood. Many cases arose as a result of bitter controversy over
the procedure, to be decided definitively in 1943 by the Supreme Court
in L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. 11. Bowles. 63 The action was one to enjoin
enforcement of a suspension order by the OPA; the Court limited its
decision to the narrow question of whether the statutory power to
allocate materials included the power to issue suspension orders and to
withhold rationed materials from established violators of ration regulations. After noting that the administrative £nding of repeated violations was not challenged, the Court concluded that suspension orders
could be issued, even though no statutory authority expressly gave that
power.
In like fashion, the congressional mandate to award contracts to
"that responsible bidder whose bid is most advantageous to the government, price and other factors considered," of course carries with it
the power to determine lack of responsibility. A suspension directive
against a £rm is, in essence, such a determination. But it has ramifications beyond that type of determination and is far more serious than
the normal determination of lack of responsibility.
One considerably older Supreme Court case buttresses the view
that a power to suspend exists: fo United States 11. Adams64 the Court
held that the Secretary of War was legally correct in suspending payment on an existing contract until all of the facts were available to the
paying officers and could be evaluated to ascertain the propriety of cer63

322 U.S. 398, 64 S.Ct. 1097 (1944).
U.S. 463 (1868).

64 74
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tain payments. Payment on the contract had been held up pending
investigation of allegations of fraud committed by Army procurement
officers and Adams.
Before, however, power to suspend contractors suspected of fraud
may be accorded a legal basis another hurdle must be overcome:
whether suspension is "punitive" or "remedial" in nature. Although
this is essentially a sterile inquiry, productive more of logic-chopping
than meaningful insight into administrative practice, it is a question
courts try to answer. The Armed Services Procurement Regulation is
careful to point out that suspension "will be for the purposes of protecting the interest of the government and not for punishment," indicating, perhaps, the concern of the drafters of that regulation for that
legal hurdle. The doctrine involved has been stated in this fashion:
"Administrative imposition of criminal penalties is . . . generally forbidden. But administrative imposition of civil or remedial penalties is
commonplace. . . ." 65 Here, again, the Steuart case provides some
authoritative statements. There the Court rejected the £rm's arguments
that "suspension orders are penalties to which persons will not be subjected unless the statute plainly imposes them" and denied that an
order of suspension was a "means of punishment of an offender."
Rather, the suspension order was designed "to protect the distribution
system and the interests of conservation." In like fashion, present-day
suspension of would-be contractors could be viewed not as punishment,
but as a system designed to insure that the military procurement dollar
is spent properly.
But the Steuart case is not on all-fours with the suspension procedures of the military departments. Perhaps more of a "right" is involved
in being able to buy and sell commodities in the market than in selling
to the government. In that case the administrative :finding of repeated
violations of the regulations was not challenged on judicial review.
Undoubtedly this factor played a large part in the Court's decision.
Enough has been said, perhaps, to indicate that the power of suspension could be held to be within the power of the procurement
officials. Whether that power is properly wielded is another question.

B. Administrative Safeguards
Assuming, then, that a suspension power exists, is it being conducted with due regard to safeguards against arbitrary or mistaken
65 DAVIS, AnMINisTRATIVE

I.Aw 66 (1951).
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administrative action? _ Is there any requirement for procedural due
process standards to be adhered to in the determination of a suspension
order?
In the absence of congressional action, any due process requirements will, if they are erected at all, have to come from judicial action.
Here at the very outset a formidable obstacle is met in the decision in
the Lukens Steel case to the effect that those who would contract with
the government lack "standing" to contest administrative action. 66 By
way of dictum, the Court said that the government "enjoys the unrestricted power . . . to determine those with whom it will deal," and
concluded that a firm claiming to be aggrieved by administrative action
could not contest the action of the government in its proprietary capacity. If the doctrine of that case is adhered to, then the result would be:
summary administrative action, taken in camera without notice or opportunity to be heard, is beyond judicial relfef. That would be true
even though, as the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative
Procedure stated, "the penalty of blacklisting is so severe that its imper
sition may destroy a going business." A strange doctrine, that, in a government supposedly of laws, not of men.
. The rationale of the Lukens Steel case is based on a privilege-right
dichotomy. Contracting with· the government was held to fall within
the general class of interests called privileges, short of being a "legal
right" for the protection of which judicial review is available. Having
a privilege only, the contractor has no standing to sue since no legally
protected interest is at stake. "Due process," it has been observed, "does
not prevent the government from denying bounties or privileges without a hearing. Just as one must have a sufficient 'interest' or must be
in the technical sense 'aggrieved' or 'adversely affected' in order to
obtain judicial review of administrative action, so one must have a
legally recognized interest or right in order to be entitled to participate
in an administrative proceeding." 67
The privilege-right antinomy and the basing of judicial relief on the
pigeon-hole containing rights is scarcely a realistic approach to a complex problem of administration. As has been stated by a leading contemporary commentator, an "applicant for ... a government contract,
Cf. Walter P. Villere Co. v. Blinn, (5th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 914.
1.Aw 246-247 (1951). Cf. ''Despite the unanimity and
clarity of the Lukens Steel decision, one may still wonder whether a supplier of goods to
the Government may never have standing to challenge such an administrative regulation."
Id. at 682.
66

67 DAVIS, AnMINISTRAnvE
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whose financial well-being may be wholly dependent on the government grant, [should not be treated any differently than] one declared
to be injured in his personal or property 'rights.' " 68 The dominating
influence of government purchases upon the American economy generally and upon individual business enterprises specifically makes the
Lukens Steel doctrine unreal today. Power of life or death over a firm
is within the hands of unrestrained administrative officials; that power,
when used, involves more than the deprivation of a grant, benefit, or
privilege in the traditional sense. 69 The "standing" doctrine, if it precludes effective redress for parties the object of suspension action,
involves an economic favor of great importance in present-day America.
"When the Government's purchases are so great that they dominate
the entire economy, the implications of the Perkins decision with
respect to unreviewable administrative power can hardly be overstated."70 The point is not whether the government has or does not
have the power to deny award of contracts or whether the award of a
contract is or is not a privilege. Rather, it is whether such privileges
should be denied to individual business firms without the latter being
afforded an opportunity to obtain a judicial decision on the legality or
the propriety of such denials. "Absolute discretion," Justice Douglas
once remarked, "like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of
liberty."11
At this juncture, it may be well to refer to recent legislation which
at least limits, if not overturns, the Lukens Steel decision. In 1952
Congress amended the Defense Production Act to provide in part for
judicial review of certain determinations under the Walsh-Healey Act:
"Notwithstanding the inclusion of any stipulations required
by any provision of this Act in any contract subject to this Act,
any interested person shall have the right of judicial review of any
legal question which might otherwise be raised, including, but not
limited to, wage determinations and the interpretation of the terms
'IocaIity,' 'regular dealer,' 'manufacturer,' and 'open market.' "7-"
68 SCHWARTZ, FRENcH ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND nm CoMMoN-LAw WoRLD 159
(1954).
69 This was recognized by the Secretary of Labor early in the history of the administration of the Walsh-Healey Act. That official reportedly was reluctant to invoke the blacklist provisions of the act since blacklisting might destroy a going business and thus defeat
one of the purposes of the act by eliminating employment opportunities. Cf. CHAMBERLAIN, DoWLINo AND HAYs, Tm1 JUDICIAL FUNCTION IN FEDERAL AnMINISTRAnvE
AoBNCIBS 107-109 (1942).
70 Nathanson, "Central Issues of American Administrative Law," 45 AM.. PoL. Ser.
REv. 348 at 373 (1951).
11 In New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882 at 884, 72 S.Ct. 152 (1951).
7266 Stat. L. 308 (1952), 41 U.S.C. (1952) §43a(c).
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Just what effect this legislation will have is not clear. Some indication,
however, of the intent of Congress may be derived from the following
statement by Senator Fulbright: "It is our purpose, by this amendment,
to overturn that [Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.] decision." 73 Does it give
"standing" to contestants of administrative action on contracts? Within
the field of the contracts covered by the Walsh-Healey Act, it seems
clear that it does. It has been so held: in Covington Mills v. Durkin, ·
a case where a restraining order of a minimum wage determination was
sought, the federal district court said that, despite the Lukens Steel
case, the complainants "have a standing to sue for the simple reason
that ... the Fulbright Amendment [provides for] ... the very kind
of review they are seeking here." 74
If that is true, then how much validity does the Lukens Steel case
have today? Apparently little so far as its precise holding is concerned,
for Congress has overruled the Supreme Court. A great deal, perhaps,
on the broader question of lack of standing and the consequent freedom
of the· government to deny contracts. An example here is Atlantic
Freight Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield where a motor carrier sought to
enjoin issuance of a postage stamp commemorating the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad's 125th anniversary. In a per curiam opinion, the court,
affirming and quoting the district court, said: "It is by now clear that
neither damage nor. loss of income in consequence of the action of
Government, which is not an invasion of recognized legal rights, is in
itself a source of legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation
recognizing it as such," 75 citing the Lukens Steel case. Although an
argument could be made that Congress in the Fulbright Amendment
indicated a preference against the latter case, it is probably safe to
assume that the amendment will have but a limited application and
will probably be confined entirely to Walsh-Healey determinations.
Courts will probably continue to hew to the line of no standing, and
will not create new concepts of judicial controversies in the public
contract field.
But in any event, adherence to a sterile privilege-right division is
not helpful. Conceptualistic thinking seldom is helpful to understanding, however convenient it may be. The test should not be what the
98 CoNG. R:Ec. 6531 (1952).
Pnrn & F1sCHER, ADMIN. LAw (2d ser.) 221 (D.C. D.C. 1953). This case has
now been decided on the merits with the determination of the Secretary of Labor under
the Walsh-Healey Act overturned by the federal district court. Covington Mills v.
Mitchell, 23 U.S. Law Week 2510 (April 12, 1955).
75 (D.C. Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 64.
73

74 3
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Court in the Lukens Steel case leads one to believe: whether a contractor or bidder on government contracts has a legal right or merely a
privilege. Such an approach really assumes the answer in its mere
statement of the problem. Rather, the issue is whether, in choosing
those with whom it will do business, the government will be required
to pay attention to those fundamental standards of fair play usually
subsumed under the rubric of procedural due process. Roscoe Pound
has said:
"In administrative adjudication there is an obstinate tendency
to decide without a hearing, or without hearing one of the parties,
or after conference with one of the parties in the absence of the
other, whose interests are adversely affected, or to treat the statutory requirement of a hearing as a mere formality and act upon
preformed opinions as to the order to be made. Another closely
related tendency is to make determinations on the basis of reports
not divulged, giving the party affected no opportunity to refute or
explain. Another is to make determinations seriously affecting
individual rights without a basis i.n evidence of rational probative
force. Another no less widespread but not easy to reach under
the statutes and procedure of today is to set up and give effect to
policies beyond or even at variance with the statutes or the general
law governing the action of the administrative agency." 76
This generalized indictment by Pound may or may not have general application or may or may not be generally true. Quite possibly
it is too severe. 77 But does it not have application to the specific case
of suspensions of suspected contractors as carried out today? Much of
what he says is true of the suspension procedure: there is no hearing;
reports of investigation are not divulged; no explicit statutory authority
exists for the procedure. More than that, the party affected is not even
informed of the suspension until he finds a bid rejected or payments
withheld, and even at that time he is not told of the nature of the
charges against him, what he is believed to have done, or how long the
suspension will last. A clearer case of administrative absolutism would
be hard to imagine. As Bentham has remarked, "where there is no publicity, there is no justice."
76 Pound, ''The Challenge of the Administrative Process," 30 A.B.A.J. 121 at 123
(1944).
77 Certainly it was too severe for the specific matter Pound was discussing: OPA suspension orders. Apparently he was writing under a mistaken view of the facts. See Field,
''Rationing Suspension Orders: A Reply to Dean Pound," 30 A.B.A.J. 385 (1944). But
see Smith, "Comment on Mr. Field's Reply for the OPA," 30 A.B.A.J. 390 (1944).
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C. Suspension in World War II
A comparison with the procedures set up during World War II
controlling the issuance of suspension orders by the OPA and WPB
indicates the scope of unchecked power presently resting in procurement officers. In both of those wartime agencies scrupulous regard was
paid to procedural safeguards so that the parties affected had every
opportunity of notice, hearing, judicial review and the other due process requirements. "In the use of the suspension power great care [was]
taken by OPA to safeguard the individual from any injustice... ." 18
Some difference of opinion may have existed at that time on the validity of that statement. But for present purposes it can be said that the
OPA procedure seems a very model of fairness when compared to contractor-suspension techniques which are based upon mere suspicion of
irregularity.
Similarly, the WPB took care to erect and maintain safeguards for
individuals affected by suspension orders. Although there may not
have been strict legal necessity for such action, the WPB, after issuing
its first suspension order in 1941, took care to formalize and improve
its technique so that the end of providing safeguards for the persons
believed to be violating the priority regulations was furthered. 19 The
procedure included notice to the .alleged violator, a hearing conducted
by a compliance commissioner, the power to compel attendance of witnesses for both parties, written and oral arguments, and judicial review
of any suspension order. 80

D. Countervailing Considerations
So much, then, for the case for a new procedure within the buying
agency itself, one which would give the business enterprises affected
an opportunity to be treated openly. Are there compelling arguments
on the other side in support of the present method of operation? What
can be said in favor of it?
The arguments are two-fold: (a) those based on the technical legal
argument that a contractor, present or would-be, has no standing to
contest such action; the view is that the action of the government is
proprietary in nature and subject to no inhibitions other than those
self-imposed by statute or internal administrative directive; and (b)
18 Field, ''Rationing Suspension Orders: A Reply to Dean Pound," 30 A.B.A.J. 385
at 386 (1944).
1 9 See O'Brian and Fleischmann, "The War Production Board Administrative Policies
and Procedures," 13 GEo. WASH. L. REv. I (1944), for an account of the WPB procedure.
so Id. at 50-54.
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those based on the view that divulging the charges to the firm affected
will in some manner operate both to prejudice or compromise whatever
subsequent case the Department of Justice may have against the party
and to place an undue burden on the procurement process.
The technical legal argument will stand or fall on the present
validity of the broad Lukens Steel doctrine. In addition to the Fulbright
Amendment of 1952, some question may be raised as to whether the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) has changed the situation. Definitive answer to this question appears to be shrouded in doubt. Two
problems are implicit in the question: are the military departments subject to the APA, and does section l O of the APA change prior doctrine
on judicial review?
On the first problem, the short answer is that the APA does apply
to the military establishment, except as noted in the APA itself, for the
reason that the APA is designed to apply to agencies in a functional
manner. Specific agencies, as such, are not exempted; the act "was
intended to apply to the entire executive branch of the Federal Government."81 Exceptions to its coverage have been drawn functionally,
not with the idea of placing entire agencies beyond its reach. "The Act
is comprehensive in scope and in terms applies to the executive and all
administrative agencies, but exceptions are provided for as to certain
types of functions. Thus, for example, while there is no exemption
under the Act for the War and Navy Departments as such, Section
2(a) exempts courts-martial, military commissions, and military or
naval authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied
territory."82 The legislative history and recent judicial decisions back
up this conclusion. "[I]t has been the undeviating policy to deal with
types of functions as such and in no case with administrative agencies
by name. Thus certain war and defense functions are exempted, but
not the War or Navy Departments in the performance of their other
functions." 83 In Lassiter v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit said in the course of holding that the War Department was a federal agency, "The authority to act with the sanction
of government behind it determines whether or not a governmental
agency exists. The form the agency takes, or the function it performs
are not determinative of the question of whether it is an agency...."84
81 Schwartz, ''The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation," 29 N.Y. UNIV. L.
REv. 1173 at 1175 (1954).
82 VANDERBILT, THE DoC'l'RlNE OF THE SEPARATION oF PoWERs AND lTs PRESENTDAY SrcNIFrCANcB 87 (1953).
83 ADMINisTRA'I'IVB PROCEDURE Ac:r, LncrsLATIVB HrsTORY, S. Doc. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d sess., p. 191 (1946).
84 (9th Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 984 at 991.
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So much, then, for the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act: it would appear that at least the "housekeeping" functions
of the military departments are within its purview. Does the act change
the no-standing doctrine?
Section IO(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act gives standing
to "any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of
any relevant statute...."85 One view of the meaning of this provision
is that it "undoubtedly adds nothing to the law."86 A recent case buttresses this view: in Clement Martin, Inc. v. Dick Corp., 87 the plaintiff was the low bidder on a contract to construct a hospital but the
award went to the next highest bidder. The district court dismissed
the action while asserting that even though plaintiff might have suffered
grievous harm, the Administrative Procedure Act did not create rights
but merely conferred jurisdiction to review discretionary acts of agencies which affect existing statutory rights. If, then, section IO(a) of
the Administrative Procedure Act merely restates prior law, it would
appear to be clear that suspension would not be susceptible to judicial
review.
The other reason for not disclosing the situation to the party affected-possible prejudice to a later legal action by the Department of
Justice-does not hold water. In the £.rst place, it is hardly a sound
argument to say that fair play may be dispensed with in order to build
up a possible criminal or civil action. The very genius of the American legal system is against such procedure. Perhaps an even more
compelling argument may be made by comparing again the OPA and
WPB wartime procedure. In both of those agencies, criminal sanctions were applicable to violations of the statutes; but this was not
deemed of sufficient importance to prohibit holding hearings. In
WPB suspension hearings, the hearing officer had the following alternatives open to him: he could close the case, recommend submission
to the Department of Justice for criminal or civil action or recommend issuance of a suspension order. As of October 1, 1944, some
1500 compliance hearings had been held, with 430 cases referred to
the Department of Justice for action.88 It would seem to be clear
60 Stat. L. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §l009(a).
Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 670 at 690 (1947).
s1 (D.C. Pa. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 961. But cf. American President Lines v. FMB,
(D.C. D.C. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 346.
88 O'Brian and Fleischmann, "The War Production Board Administrative Policies and
Procedures," 13 GEo. WASH. L. R.Ev. 1 at 51 (1944).
85
86
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that administrative secrecy is not a necessary prerequisite to successful
prosecution.
At best, then, the argument in favor of secrecy and lack of hearing rests on technical legal grounds. No compelling policy argument
is in favor of it, other than possible delay in the procurement process
with attendant confusion and harm to the national defense effort.
That type of argument swayed the Court in the Lukens Steel case:
"Courts should not, where Congress has not done so, subject purchasing agencies of Government to the delays necessarily incident to
judicial scrutiny at the instance of potential sellers, which would be
contrary to traditional government practice and would create a new
concept of judicial controversies. A like restraint applied to purchasing by private business would be widely condemned as an intolerable
business handicap. It is . . . essential to the even and expeditious
functioning of Government that the administration of the purchasing
machinery be unhampered." 80 But does not such a view make too
much of expediency and efficiency? Equally, it would be more efficient
for many governmental activities now subject to court review to be unhampered by judical scrutiny, but that is scarcely an argument for
doing away with the machinery of judicial review or the underlying
purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act. The self-limitation
may indicate too great a deference to the procurement expert. 0° Furthermore, it is doubtful that an undue delay would eventuate should
suspension procedures be changed.

E. A Fair Procedure
In any event, alleged delay is more of an argument against judicial
intervention than it is against an administrative hearing of the nature
provided for by the APA. If true in purchasing, why would not the
same argument prevail in priority and materials allocations during time
of war? Apparently no adverse effect was noted by either the OPA or
WPB of a type which would make unsuitable an administrative hearing and judicial review. A delay argument may be an example of what
89 Perkins

v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 at 130, 60 S.Ct. 869 (1940).
a discussion of modern judicial deference to the executive branch in the fields
of public employment, treatment of aliens and the postal service, see McCloskey, "The
McCarran Act and the Doctrine of Arbitrary Power" in PuBLIC POLICY: A YEARBOOK OP
nm GRADUATE ScHooL oP PUBLIC .An:MINisTRAnoN, HAnvARD UNIVERSITY 228 (1953).
And for a trenchant criticism of the doctrine of the Lukens Steel case, see Davis, ''Umeviewable Administrative Action," 15 F.R.D. 411 at 421 et seq. (1954).
90 For
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Justice Frankfurter noted in another case, that of "conjuring up horrible possibilities that never happen in the real world...." 91
A fair-play requirement would be one calling not so much for
judicial review as for procedural safeguards within the agency itself.
Probably the ordinary channels of judicial review of administrative
action, i.e., consideration of the validity of the action in an enforcement proceeding or in a suit brought by a party to enjoin enforcement,
would not be satisfactory. That could delay procurement; certain it is
that obtaining military requirements should not be held up, if held up
in fact they would be, pending the outcome of the usually slow-moving
judicial process.
Necessary instead is some sort of administrative procedure which
would allow firms in question to have notice of the charges, to appear
and to present evidence, to question witnesses, and to enjoy other procedural safeguards. No delay would necessarily accompany such a
system. Such a procedural requirement could be set up with the
recognition that denials of the contracting privilege is really a penalty
in fact, and a most drastic one, when financial life is at stake, and,
as presently carried out, is punishment before conviction. Even the
WPB suspension orders were recognized to have a punitive aspect:
"there is unquestionably an incidental punitive element in the proposed [suspension] action ...." 92 This is particularly true when suspension runs on for months, even years; the longer it remains in force
the more drastic the impact upon the firm itself.93 The impact is both
financial in losing out on government business and in the firm's reputation: the knowledge that a company is "in bad" with the government
becomes known and has a deleterious effect on the firm's reputation,
good will and credit standing.
91New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 at 583, 66 S.Ct. 310 (1946).
92 O'Brian and Fleischmann, ''The War Production Board Administrative Policies and
Procedures," 13 GEo. WASH. L. Rllv. 1 at 49 (1944). See also Am. GEN. CoMM. ON
Ao. Pnoc., DIVISION OF Ptmuc CoNTRAcrs 4 (1939): ''The withholding of government
business may be an exceedingly drastic, if not altogether ruinous penalty."
93 For an account of the handling of one suspended fum by the Department of the
Army, see Senate Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small Business, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), entitled: "Participation of Small Business in Military
Procurement." At pages 1 through 91 of that document, and particularly at pages 73-77,
is testimony from Army officials about a fum first suspended on November 1, 1951; while
the suspension was modified later, apparently the firm was still suspended on November
20, 1952, when the Department of Justice notified the Army that the case was being closed
without action in the Criminal Division. It should be noted that testimony such as this
is vecy rare. Normally, information about suspended contractors is classified and closely
guarded. See ASPR 1-601.3, IA CCH, GoVT. CoNTRAcrs REP. 1129,049B (1954). For
a subsequent development of this suspension action, see 34 Comp. Gen. 180 (1954).
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Or the procedural requirement could be established with the recognition that a :6.rm has a legal right at least to be considered for government contract awards and to be treated fairly, even if there is no legal
right to obtain a contract. No one would seriously argue that a legal
right to receive contracts exists or should exist. But it can be argued
in persuasive terms that a firm should not be deprived of the opportunity to be considered for contract-award without elementary due process requirements being followed.
"Law has reached its £.nest moments when it has freed man from
the unlimited discretion of some ruler, some civil or military official,
some bureaucrat. Where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered."94 Here, then, is an opportunity for law to exprience one of
those moments.
VII.

CONCLUSION

An examination has been made in general terms of occasions when
federal procurement officials may refuse to do business with would-be
contractors. Special emphasis has been placed upon the procedure of
suspending firms suspected of irregular dealings, since that procedure
raises some important questions in administrative law.
In 1940 the Supreme Court stated clearly that the federal government enjoys an unrestricted power to set the terms and conditions upon
which it will do business and to choose those with whom it would
contract. But even if that statement is presently valid, it still does not
give the individual procurement officer unfettered freedom of choice
of contractor. Congress, the President, the courts and the Comptroller
General have all imposed inhibitions upon that freedom. In addition,
the procurement officer's agency regulations both refine the externally9 4 Justice Douglas in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 at 101, 72 S.Ct. 154
(1951). It appears to be meet to quote additional language from Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion:
" ••• Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than
any of man's other inventions.
"The instant case reveals only a minor facet of the agelong struggle. The result
reached by the Court can be rationalized or made plausible by casting it in terms of contract
law: the parties need not have made this contract; those who contract with the Government must turn square comers; the parties will be left where their engagement brought
them. And it may be that in this case the equities are with the Government, not with the
contractor. But the rule we announce has wide application and a devastating effect. It
makes a tyrant out of every contracting officer. He is granted the power of a tyrant even
though he is stubborn, perverse or captious. He is allowed the power of a tyrant though
he is incompetent or negligent. He has the power of life and death over a private business
even though his decision is grossly erroneous. Power granted is seldom neglected."
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imposed proscriptions and add new limitations on his freedom and the
exercise of his autliority.
Blacklists developed under statutory warrant have administrative
safeguards designed to prevent arbitrary action. But nonstatutory blacklisting-suspension-is conducted in secret, in the absence of any such
safeguards. A strong and perhaps compelling argument can be made
for a change in suspension procedures leading toward the prevention
of possible arbitrary action.

